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Tunisia: Democracy and Islam in Post Arab Spring Politics 
Abstract:  
Since the ousting of the former regime and the first free and fair elections 
in 2011 in Tunisia, political Islamist parties have been in the majority. The ruling 
party did not have a mandate, which necessitated concessions.  Nonetheless, 
religion, balanced with a history of institutional secularism enforced by a dictator, 
has impacted the creation of a democracy. Inequality and repression drove 
protestors to the streets to demand new governance. These problems, along with 
religion and societal norms, influence the meaning of democracy in Tunisia. This 
paper will explore the thin lines between religion, democracy and the everyday 
politics of Tunisia, most notably found in political history, citizens’ attitudes, and 
the implementation of a new Constitution. It will argue that Tunisia maintains 
democracy but not in the traditional Western understanding of institutional 
democracy. Instead, it combines elements of religion and polity.  
Introduction: 
 The Arab Spring started in Tunisia when mass demonstrations forced the 
ruling regime, led by President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, to step down in January 
2011. In October 2011, Tunisia held its first free and fair elections, and the 
primary Islamist party, Ennahda, won a majority of seats for the newly formed 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA), which was tasked with creating a new 
Constitution. However, they did not win an absolute majority and formed a ruling 
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troika with the Congress Party for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol. After three 
years of economic depression, numerous demonstrations, and the formation of 
new institutions, the NCA ratified a new Constitution in January 2014.  In the 
recent history of Tunisia, including the implementation of the Constitution, the 
nation started to implement democracy. However, Tunisian democracy may not 
be identical to Western forms of democracy. Instead, as the overwhelming 
majority of Tunisians are Muslim, there is a greater influence of religious 
principles in government, creating an Islamic democracy. 
 To understand the issues surrounding this new democracy, we must first 
look at the terms associated with Tunisia’s polity.  The state draws largely on a 
history of secular policies under authoritarian leaders alongside Muslim influence 
in society. Now, pushing against authoritarianism, Tunisia is forming democracy 
but in a way that does not entirely align with Western interpretations of the word. 
In understanding what these terms mean in the Tunisian context, we can then look 
at the political history from the end of French colonialism until the recent 
ratification of the Constitution. To explore the issues of Tunisian democracy, we 
will look at polling data, the new Constitution, and the events that led to the 
adoption of the Constitution.  
Literature Review:  
Tunisia’s post-colonial history was determined by Western-educated men 
influenced by French liberalism and modernization. President Habib Bourguiba, 
the first president of the Republic, especially believed that religion and modernity 
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were incompatible, and he attempted to institutionalize elements of secularism 
during his presidency. Following Bourguiba, President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali 
tried to take this action even further by outlawing Islamist parties, though Ben 
Ali’s policies intended to silence dissent more than promote secularism. With the 
overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime, Islamism (political Islam) was reintroduced in 
Tunisia’s politics and was popular among the general population. However, there 
remains a strong secular minority in Tunisia. The divide between politically 
secular and politically Islamic is important to understand in the Tunisian context. 
As Islamism and secularism demand opposite values and policies, this will greatly 
impact how Tunisia defines itself as it forms a democracy, especially since many 
values of democracy and Islamism do not directly oppose one another, though 
some Western thinkers have implied that democracy is a primarily Western value. 
Furthermore, religion plays a central and influential role in the everyday life of 
Tunisians and has affected the politics of many citizens, just as societal morals 
move Western voters. To explore the underlying tensions in Tunisian politics and 
to understand the formation of a new government, we must first understand what 
is meant by secularism, Islamism, and democracy. These terms are largely 
contested, so we will look at a specific understanding of each word in the 
Tunisian context.  
Generally, secularism means separation of church and state. Secular states, 
like the United States or most Western democracies, draw a line between religious 
institutions and government. Adrien Katherine Wing (2006) more precisely 
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identifies an ideal secular nation in her study of Turkish secularism1. In a secular 
government, political parties should not have religious ties. Religious texts should 
not drive legislation. Education and religion should be separate, and religious 
texts should not be part of public education. Secular nations should not show 
deference to particular religious groups; therefore, constitutionally secular nations 
should not have a state religion. According to Wing (2006), these are the ideal 
principles of a secular nation, but a secular nation may not necessarily comply 
with all of these guidelines. Western culture associates “secular” with 
“democratic2”  in regards to governance. Yet, as we see in Tunisian history, 
secularism also exists in authoritarian forms of government. Sometimes, 
authoritarians may protect minorities or promote separation of church and state 
more vehemently than democracies for various reasons.  They may use such 
policies to maintain power or to gain support of Western states.  Therefore, it is 
not a consistent democratic value.  
Secularism is not universally the same. In the United States, the state may 
not interfere in religion and must protect religious freedom. Religious speech is 
one of the most protected forms of speech under American law. However, many 
non-Western nations follow the example of French laïcité. Laïcité translates to 
“secularism,” but is practiced very differently. In France, religion is excluded to 
the place privé and may not be exhibited in public. Most famously, in 2011, the 
French government banned the hijab, or headscarf, in public schools and other 
                                                          
1
 Wing draws on the work of Yilmaz Aliefendioglu who explored the Turkish definition 
of secularism.  
2
 The association of democracy with secularism comes from Enlightenment thinkers who 
prized reason over religion, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who later 
influenced the formation of democratic governments. 
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governmental offices because ostentatious displays of religion are forbidden 
under laïcité (Erlanger, 2011). Laïcité influenced many young democracies and 
former French colonies. Notably, democratic Turkey constitutionalized a very 
similar form of secularism (Wing and Varol, 2006) but the current ruling party is 
an Islamist party. As a former French colony, Tunisia and its leaders were heavily 
influenced by laïcité and small elements thereof are seen in the newly adopted 
Constitution. However, historically, many secular practices are associated with 
colonialism and with authoritarianism (Esposito and Voll, 1996: 16). 
Furthermore, some conservatives question the faith of officials who advocate 
policies that are secular in nature. Such a ploy is not only dangerous politically 
but has also led to physical threats against these advocates. These heated 
exchanges make the question of constitutional and practiced secularism very 
serious for the development of a new government in Tunisia. Islamism sharply 
contrasts with secularism. However, both have influenced Tunisian history, 
current politics, and societal understandings of Tunisian events.  While secularism 
played a larger role in the post-colonial government of Tunisia, the post-Arab 
Spring government draws more on Islamism, though both schools of thought are 
now represented in Tunisian policy.  
Simply put, Islamism, or political Islam, denotes Islam as a political 
movement encompassing religious beliefs along with political ideology. 
According to Roger Hardy (2010), political Islam is “the notion that Islam (is) not 
just a religion and a way of life but an all-encompassing political and social 
ideology.” Islamist parties are typically characterized by a desire to use Quranic 
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law in legislation, which is not just limited to the more radical and conservative 
sharia law. Islamism grew under colonialism and was conceptualized in Egypt 
under imperial Britain when it sought to unite Egyptians through religion against 
the colonists.  It originally sought to recreate the ummah, or religious community, 
of the Prophet Mohammed in Medina in the seventh century (Hardy, 2010). The 
goal of the movement was to unite the oppressed Arab world against the non-
Muslim colonists.  Leaders united the colonies by focusing on an aspect of the 
national identity that made their followers different from the invader3.  
While a basic definition of political Islam seems self-evident, Islam itself 
is a very diverse religion, which means that since the religion itself varies from 
one country to another, the interpretation and understanding of Islam on the 
political stage varies dramatically (Strindberg and Wärn, 2011).  For example, the 
Islamism practiced by  the leading party in Tunisia, Ennahda, is different from the 
Islamism seen by factions in Afghanistan. Islamism in Tunisia is not monolithic 
and rural areas tend to be more conservative than industrialized and urban areas. 
Furthermore, the ideology of Islamism does not serve as an alternative to the 
political values of democracy, socialism, communism, or fascism but frequently 
may complement such values, especially since political Islam generally does not 
imply a specific form of government, such as democracy (Esposito and Voll 
1996).  It also directly opposes the Western liberal idea of separation of church 
                                                          
3
 The concept of national identity continued to influence anti-colonial and post-colonial 
movements in independent North Africa and Middle East, even though many formed 
secular governments. Tunisia’s own post-colonial history grew out of a nationalist 
movement that separated from a more religiously-based party.  
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and state because it serves as a tool to link church and state to each other. 
Incorporating elements of the faith and practice in Islam to political decision-
making is a goal and virtue of Islamism. Many early proponents of Islamism saw 
it as being in direct competition with Western secularism, which is why it was a 
tool of anti-colonial movements (Strindberg and Wärn, 2011). Today, many 
Western thinkers see it as incompatible with democracy, especially since many 
Western democracies have largely drawn on secularism.   
Before the ratification of the constitution, Tunisian Islamist legislators 
pushed for religious law in the constitution. They were largely denied.  However, 
this idea did not lack support among citizens. Religion plays an active and visible 
role in the everyday lives of Tunisians, so many wished the new form of 
government to reflect the principles of Tunisian society.  While Muslim nations 
are no longer under colonial rule, Muslim identity may be invoked against 
Western imperialism. Religion still unites citizens. As its prominence in political 
life grows, it sometimes serves as a campaign tool to attract voters or as a 
dangerous weapon against the politically secular. However, just as political Islam 
across the world is different, adherents of Islamism in Tunisia do not always 
agree. Ennahda is the leading Islamist party. It won a plurality of votes in the 
2011 election and currently heads the coalition government with two other parties, 
the Congress Party for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol. Party leaders refer to 
Ennahda as a moderate party, but opponents believe that Ennahda wishes to 
impose more conservative policies (Arieff, 2011). Its constituency is not uniform. 
Members in the city are frequently less traditional than members in rural areas. 
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Like most political movements, Ennahda must deal with the influence of 
conservative, in this case salafist, movements that do not reflect the majority of 
the party. However, Ennahda must also adhere to the party’s mainstream while 
overseeing a government that includes opponents of Islamism.   The opposing 
views of secularists and Ennahda have been a major source of contention in 
forming democracy in Tunisia after the Arab Spring. 
The Arab Spring had many goals, but analysts often consider the 
establishment of a representative democracy with greater freedom of speech and 
expression to be one of these goals. However, democracy is not translated the 
same universally and is a highly contested word among political scientists. 
Western democracies focus on institutions of democracy, such as election 
systems, bicameralism, and checks and balances. Many non-Western democracies 
believe that the government should create equality. This differs from traditional, 
Western democracy because these forms of government were founded on the 
natural rights theory of John Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers, including 
the American Founding Fathers. According to natural rights philosophy, man is 
born equally free with the same inherent rights. Lockean governments are 
established to protect the natural rights (life, liberty, and property) that exist in the 
state of nature, and the government shall not interfere with these rights.  From this 
point of view, man is born inherently and equally free from compulsion. 
Government does not aim to create all men equal but to protect existing equal 
rights. However, non-Western governments are not built primarily on Lockean 
democracy or natural rights doctrine. Instead of focusing on an equal state of 
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nature, they observe the inequality of present conditions. It becomes the duty of 
government to make citizens equal. These perceptions create different goals for 
democracy as well as different understandings of implementing democracy. For 
instance, constitutions of such governments tend to emphasize social justice and 
equity. As a young democracy, Tunisia is still deciding what democracy will 
mean in the Tunisian context. In this framework, we cannot create a consistent 
definition and apply it to Tunisia and say that this young government is 
definitively democratic. Instead, we must observe the values that shape political 
decisions, elections, and the newly formed constitution to understand what 
democracy will look like as Tunisia establishes new institutions. Nonetheless, it is 
helpful to differentiate traditional and non-traditional understandings of 
democracy in order to display the meaning and the value of democracy from a 
non-occidental background.  
To start with a traditional definition, Robert A. Dahl (1971) provided a 
clear, modern understanding of the Western perception of democracy in his book, 
Polyarchy, which details the patterns of democratization. Dahl works off of the 
conclusion of Joseph Schumpeter that democracy can be understood as the sum of 
its institutions. For Dahl, democratization includes, “the development of a 
political system that allows for opposition or competition between a government 
and its opponents (Dahl, 1971: 1).” This primarily is understood to mean that 
democratization consists of democratic institutions, namely elections. In Dahl’s 
view, for a system to become democratic, it must respond to its citizens primarily 
by ensuring that they may formulate their own preferences and signify these 
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preferences to one another and to the government through individual or collective 
action.  Then, the government should weigh each individual’s preference equally 
to that of other individuals. Each of these three components of a democracy 
includes special freedoms and rights, though free and fair elections with the 
opportunity for dissent is vital to each component and perhaps the overriding 
theme of a democratic state. Dahl notes on the other hand, “Even the most 
repressive dictators usually pay some lip service today to the legitimate right of 
the people to participate in the government, that is, to participate in ‘governing’ 
though not in public contestation (Dahl, 1971: 5).” He sees that a country may, for 
example, have universal suffrage, but still not allow opportunity to express 
opposition to policy or leadership. In Dahl’s view, the rights to participate and to 
oppose the government are two of the most important aspects of a democracy and 
generally manifested in the form of elections. Both of these rights come from 
institutional understandings of what democracy should be.  
In expanding the work of Dahl and a modern understanding of democracy, 
Samuel Huntington further analyzed the meaning of democracy in The Third 
Wave (1991). Huntington tells us that democracy today is best understood in the 
procedures that establish government, and he considers the “selection of leaders 
through competitive elections” to be the paramount procedure. He affirms that 
democracy should promote universal suffrage and free and fair elections with 
multiple parties: “Elections, open, free, and fair are the essence of democracy, 
inescapable sine qua non (Huntington, 1991: 9).” If elections create a democracy, 
then the peaceful transition of government and a division of powers empower a 
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democracy to thrive. Huntington also asserts that democracy is an important 
political virtue but it does not necessarily influence further virtue in a 
government. This largely differs from many non-Western understandings of 
democracy in which democracy can be used to promote further political virtue. 
Huntington and Dahl frame democracy in regard to its institutions, such as 
elections or separation of powers. They do not explore the value that citizens tend 
to place on democracy or the idea that democracy may benefit its citizens. With 
an institutional and empirical conception of democracy, one can perceive it solely 
as a form of government measured without regard to the physical benefit of a 
nation. However, as Huntington implies, nations frequently understand 
democracy as both a form of government consisting of institutions and as a virtue 
that enables these institutions to function. As both a value and a style of 
governance, the West understands democracy as the sum of political participation 
and the rights to participate. As seen in the works of Huntington and Dahl, 
Western democracy may not necessarily promote greater equality, but it should 
protect natural rights of citizens. Conversely, if a society associates democracy 
with social justice, then it may be understood as something more than a form of 
government. It also may seek to foster equality among citizens in ways that 
Westerners could perceive as threatening to natural liberties.   
The word “democracy” does not have a universal meaning. In order to 
explore different interpretations of “democracy,” Fred Schaffer conducted a case 
study in democratic Senegal which he discusses in Democracy in Translation 
(1991). As Senegal is a largely bilingual nation, he investigated the difference 
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between the French word démocratie, which he discovered to largely resemble 
American democracy, and the Wolof word demokaraasi. He discovered that 
certain values were attached to demokaraasi that differ from values attached to 
democracy and démocratie. He pushes against the institutional understanding of 
democracy advocated by Dahl and Huntington because of the differing values  of 
demokaraasi cannot be understood in a purely empirical study of democratic 
institutions. He further argues that the translation of the word democracy to apply 
to various governments and cultures is faulty “because the cultural premises that 
infuse American practices and institutions may not be universal (Schaffer, 1991: 
14).” Instead, Schaffer discovered that demokaraasi implied elections, just like 
democracy, but was also associated with “collectivist ideals of welfare,” which 
are not inherently democratic in a Western understanding. Social governmental 
assistance was associated with the Wolof term. In concluding his study, Schaffer 
states: 
If students of democracy aspire to understand the meaning, social 
context, and democratic implications of the behaviors they 
observe, they cannot assume that their own ideals of democracy 
are universal…Even when democratic ideals are diffused 
throughout the world, local communities assimilate imported ideas 
selectively and transform them to fit their own life conditions 
(Schaffer, 1991: 146). 
The difference in ideals applies to our understanding of Tunisian democracy 
because American and Western ideals of democracy may exist in some form in 
Tunisia, but they exist alongside values and even institutions that Westerners may 
understand as undemocratic. Furthermore, as Tunisia is predominantly Muslim 
and religion plays a major part of Tunisian culture, we may find certain 
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democratic values come from the religious context and are not in accord with 
Western democratic values.  
Democratization, or the creation of democratic institutions, in former 
authoritarian regimes, such as Tunisia, represents a people’s desire for increased 
political input and empowerment. With greater empowerment and participation 
comes the fusion of societal values in the political process. As John Esposito and 
John Voll note in Islam and Democracy (1996), modern Islamists consider Islam 
to be “din wa dawla, that is religion and state (4).” Religion governs all spectrums 
of life. For devout practitioners, it could seem counter-intuitive to establish a 
government wholly separated from religion since religion dictates societal values.  
Furthermore, secularism is historically synonymous with authoritarianism in 
many Muslim nations, so a reaffirmation of Islamic identity may be viewed as a 
rejection of previous authoritarian leadership4. In comparing modern Islamist 
movements to the former nationalist movements, Esposito observes: “Just as the 
more popular nationalism’s base of support, the more Islamic its orientation, 
democratization loses its secular dimensions as it becomes a popular and more 
truly democratic movement (1996: 16).” If a nation is deeply Islamic, its 
democratic values would necessarily reflect religious values. While Western 
influence has led Muslim nations to implement democratic institutions, Islam 
fosters certain democratic principles that such nations incorporate into traditional 
Western structures. However, Western values created Western institutions and 
                                                          
4
 Authoritarianism in the Tunisian context was seen under former Presidents Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali, though it became more pronounced under Ben Ali. Here, it largely refers to 
a government which hinders massive political participation, particularly by opposing 
parties while one party dominates the political process and decision-making.   
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cannot be artificially transplanted into a nation with different values and goals. 
Instead, nations such as Tunisia must create their own structures coming from 
existing values.  
Scholars on Islam and democracy cite existing values and codes in Islam 
that are naturally democratic. Esposito points to the principles of consultation, 
consensus, and interpretive judgment as principles of democratic Islamism. While 
he admits that these values have not been traditionally tied to democracy, they are 
values already present in the culture and can be used to foster a natural 
democracy.  Faithful Muslims are encouraged to take consultation, or shura, on 
all matters. In state matters, all citizens are agents of God who give consent to a 
ruler who in turn must seek the opinion of citizens who have given up their 
natural liberty to belong to the state. This resembles the forgoing of natural 
liberties to form a government as recognized by John Locke.  Traditionally, a 
ruler must consult with others before making decisions. Some modern thinkers 
say that the Quran actually intends for a participatory ummah (Islamic 
community) with the collective will dictating action, instead of one person 
directing all affairs of the community. For a group to be directed by shura, it must 
also form consensus, ijma. The best example of ijma lies in the understanding of 
Quranic law by the ulema, which is the body of legal Muslim scholars. While the 
general population had less influence in forming ijma, the existence of this 
principle lends itself to the creation of consensus democracy. Consensus can also 
lend legitimacy to institutions necessary in governance, such as a constitution. To 
reach a consensus, each individual must be capable of “informed, independent 
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judgment,” or ijtihad. Ijtihad essentially refers to the implementation of God’s 
will even during societal upheaval. One practices such judgment everyday by 
applying religious values in normal circumstances and understanding how one 
should conduct oneself in light of societal values. This is a very important aspect 
of everyday Muslim life. It does not mean that a leader can apply ijtihad to any 
decision and claim that it follows the Quran, but it allows Muslims to apply 
religious dictums in changing circumstances. While all of these terms are debated 
among Islamist scholars, these three principles guide the building of democracy in 
the Muslim context (Esposito and Voll, 1996). They create a different 
understanding of democracy than Western perceptions because they have a 
different source and lead to different interpretations of what democracy should 
look like. For example the United States practices majority-rule democracy, so 
consensus democracy may not resemble the American system. These principles 
also come from religion and would essentially oppose secularism. Religion 
influences the creation of democracy. At the same time, these principles 
institutionalize societal values into polity by fostering a participatory, consensual 
government founded on recognition of independent judgment.  
When looking at democracy in a Muslim nation, one may expect to find 
elements of shura, ijma, and ijtihad. However, these principles are generally not 
found explicitly in Tunisian democratic institutions. Instead, we find institutions 
which enshrine the importance of these values, without necessarily mentioning 
Islam or adhering to strict religious principles. In Tunisia, these principles are 
most clearly found in the recently adopted Constitution, both in Constitutional 
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provisions and also in the process of adopting the Constitution.  Freedoms of 
speech and media, social justice and the role of religion are important values in 
the Tunisian context and are democratic principles distinctive to the Tunisian 
interpretation of democracy.  In public opinion, we see further evidence of a 
desire for a form of democracy, along with a desire for religious principles to be 
incorporated in governance. To explore the new democratic nature of Tunisia’s 
government, we will look at the historical context, particularly the absence of 
democracy and the complex relationship with Islam, under Presidents Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali.  
Historical Background:  
In understanding how Islamic democracy develops in Tunisia, one must 
also look at the past authoritarian and secular history to understand what has 
changed and is still changing. Post-colonial politics were largely secular and 
undemocratic because they were dominated by one party that discouraged 
participation by other parties. Leaders were influenced by Western education and 
instilled Western values while pushing against Muslim practices. They wanted to 
modernize Tunisia and believed that religion hindered this process. After the 
French withdrew from Tunisia, leaders often mimicked Western themes, 
primarily industrialization and secularism. “Modern” became synonymous with 
“Western” and “secular” in Arab political structures. Then, as secularism 
increased, democracy decreased. The post-colonial republic and leadership grew 
out of nationalist parties that had fought for independence, while focusing on 
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national unity. The newly insprired nationalism discouraged opposition because 
dissent weakened national unity and was shunned.  
Tunisia achieved full independence from France on March 20, 1956.  The 
first elections were held on March 25 and the Neo-Destour (“new constitution”) 
party led by Habib Bourguiba won. Neo-Destour had been the leading nationalist 
party in obtaining independence. It replaced older nationalist movements that 
were originally less vocal in demands for full independence and deeply rooted in 
Islam, unlike Neo-Destour.  Though it did not reject Islam, Neo-Destour was a 
secular movement with fewer religious ties than preceding independence parties 
because leaders of the newer movement were more influenced by French 
Enlightenment thinking due to a French education. Neo-Destour was more 
westernized than the original nationalist movements and supported a republic 
rather than the restoration of the beylicate, or monarchy, which had maintained a 
semblance of power under French occupation. In 1957, the Constituent Assembly 
deposed the bey to create the Tunisian Republic. At this time, President Bouguiba 
was given the executive and legislative powers of the former bey.  In 1959, the 
Constitution was ratified. Academics criticized the constitution due to the strong 
executive powers and said that the presidency was tailored to Bourguiba and 
future leaders would be unable to fill the role (Nelson, 1979). 
Habib Bourguiba was a charismatic leader with hero status. Like many 
early post-colonial leaders, he was educated in France and inspired by French 
rationalism and natural rights philosophy. He won the presidential election on 
four different occasions and was named president for life in March 1975. Yet, as a 
Tunisia: Democracy and Islam in Post-Arab Spring Politics 22 
 
 
post-colonial leader, Bourguiba often attempted to placate both Arab nations and 
Western governments. At the same time, Western ideas and Arab culture played 
important societal roles, as they do today. Bourguiba sought to maintain the 
modernity that the French had brought to Tunisia. Under colonialism, France had 
stabilized and stimulated the economy, albeit largely to the benefit of European 
investors (Nelson, 1979). Nonetheless, the first goal of the young republic was to 
maintain economic stability through modern means.  
However, modern means often meant introducing greater secular 
practices. In creating the vision of a modern Tunisia, the government abolished 
religious courts and absorbed many Quranic and religious schools into the 
department of education (Nelon, 1979). One notable policy passed under 
Bourguiba was the Code of Personal Status (CPS) in 1956, which offended many 
orthodox Muslims. The CPS banned polygamy, making Tunisia the first Arab-
Muslim nation to do so. It further improved the status of women by declaring that 
marriage had to be consensual between both parties and took divorce out of the 
hands of religion and family and put it into the competence of courts. Tunisian 
women came to regard Bourguiba as a great liberator. Bourguiba publicly 
demonstrated this status by going to rural areas and de-veiling women in a show 
of freedom and compassion (Charrad, 2007). In addition to this newly liberal 
status of women, Bourguiba also gained fame as an Arab leader by calling for an 
end to fasting during Ramadan, which is one of the five pillars of Islam. This 
effort was soundly resisted, though he refused to fast during the holy month 
himself (Nelson, 1979). While some of these actions had no real effect on policy 
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and others served to keep Bourguiba on a pedestal, overall the policies of 
Bourguibism reflected a new understanding of the Arab state.  He saw himself as 
“defending Islam and the Islamic character by modern means (Nelson, 1979: 94)”  
These modern means were comparable to French laïcité, which Bourguiba would 
have been familiar with, and he attempted to keep religion out of politics in a 
society where religion defines everyday life.  The post-colonial government even 
called on religion to legitimize some of its actions and respected the emotional 
and cultural attachments to Islam. 
Post-colonial Tunisia fell short of constitutional secularism; for example, 
Article 1 declared that Islam was the religion of the nation. Furthermore, the 
Tunisian president was required to be Muslim. However, the government 
remained more secular in practice. The best example lies in the implementation of 
the CPS as part of the family law code which went directly against traditional 
Muslim practices and sharia. Despite declaring his protection of religion and 
paying lip-service to Islam, Bourguiba saw many religious regulations and 
customs as “obsolete” and old-fashioned; he wanted to do away with most of 
these as seen in his implementation of the CPS (Nelson, 1979). At this same time, 
the government also sought to centralize power which led to a great consolidation 
of power, especially in the hands of the president, giving Bourguiba greater 
powers.  One academic said of the office of the presidency and the powers held by 
Bourguiba, “the makers of the Constitution let loose from the political bottle the 
jinni of arbitrary rule (Nelson, 1979: 169).” Many scholars feared that policy 
would be based on Bourguiba’s personal approval rather than a process of 
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collaboration and compromise. Political minorities were marginalized. Between 
this marginalization and Bourguiba’s prestige as a national hero, the president 
easily amassed executive control and was named president for life.  
In 1987, then Prime Minister Zine al Abidine Ben Ali had Bourguiba 
declared mentally and physically incompetent to rule and took office in a peaceful 
coup.  The end of Bourguiba’s rule was marked by a weakening economy and 
civil unrest, particularly due to an increasingly restrictive style of government 
(Charrad, 2007). Unlike Bourguiba, Ben Ali did not receive the same adoration 
from his people. Ben Ali’s presidency was characterized by very repressive 
control over the government and the harsh persecution of political opponents and 
religious groups. Corruption was rampant, and the president and his family were 
especially seen as highly corrupt. Freedom of expression, political participation, 
and human rights were restricted. Ennahda, a moderate and influential Islamist 
party formed in 1981, was declared illegal because of its religious roots and some 
members lived in exile for many years during the Ben Ali regime (Arieff, 2011). 
By restricting political participation, Ben Ali wanted to maintain power and 
prevent resistance. His actions were not motivated by fear of political Islam itself 
but a fear of competition. The mentality of nationalist unity was replaced with 
pure authoritarianism which harshly silenced criticisms. Under this regime, the 
government sought to placate citizens by offering nominal changes such as further 
changes to the CPS in 1993. Though largely insignificant, these changes were a 
further break from traditional Islamic law codes (Charrad, 2007). In small 
offerings such as these, Ben Ali could maintain the support of Western powers 
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through secular practices and in keeping Islamist parties at bay. However, in 
restricting political participation of all other parties and silencing any opposition, 
Ben Ali’s regime was wholly undemocratic. Under Ben Ali, the government 
became more restrictive and corrupt. This stifling background created the 
environment for the protests of the Arab Spring. 
Corruption and human rights violations, coupled with major economic 
downturn, were the leading causes for the Arab Spring. The revolution started in 
small, rural Sidi Bouzid, located in the interior of Tunisia (Arieff, 2011). Like 
many of the interior cities of Tunisia, Sidi Bouzid is less-developed than urban 
centers such as Tunis.  On December 17, 2010, a young producer seller, 
Mohammed Boazizi set himself on fire in protest of police brutality. This action 
started a wave of protests and calls for the resignation of Ben Ali. The protests 
were originally concerned with the lack of economic development. However, as 
protests mounted, the government acted to stop the movement by sending troops 
to the streets and imposing a nation-wide curfew. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali 
officially resigned from his position after almost 24 years in power and fled the 
country. Shortly thereafter, the government was re-shuffled and a temporary 
government formed. Ben Ali’s party, (RCD), was disbanded and most officials 
were replaced with less partisan officers (Arieff, 2011).  
Post-Arab Spring Politics 
Politics existed in an almost vacuum at this point. With the former ruling 
party forced out of government and disbanded, formerly banned parties started 
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vying for recognition. Unlike the independence movement led by a nationalist 
party, the revolution was not led by a single party but was ignited by the people’s 
anger and mostly formed by youth who had been deprived of opportunities. It 
was, in many ways, a very democratic action as the people demanded their rights 
and a better government. It bears similarities to the original natural rights doctrine 
with the populace uprooting a tyrant that did not adequately protect life or 
property. However, angry masses cannot govern a nation, so existing parties, that 
formerly had little voice, started campaigning. Throughout the campaigning, 
Ennahda held the majority. Ennahda has traditionally advocated for Islamic 
democracy. It also supported the use of Quranic law in creating a new constitution 
while voicing respect for the CPS and women’s rights. Prior to the elections, the 
party also claimed to support separation of church and state, though opponents 
suspected this statement to be a campaign tool (Arieff, 2011). On October 23, 
2011, Tunisia held its first free and fair elections with a multi-party system. In 
fact, over 100 parties registered to run in these premier elections. Ennahda won 
the majority of votes but did not receive a mandate with 89 of 217 seats in the 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) (European Forum for Democracy and 
Solidarity, 2014).  It formed a ruling troika with two other majority parties. The 
NCA was formed with the purpose of drafting a new constitution.  
This constitutional process took much longer than expected, largely due to 
the deep distrust between liberals (frequently secularists) and Islamists. Both sides 
believed that they were protecting the ideals and institutions of Tunisia. 
Furthermore, internal party struggles, particularly for Ennahda, created tension 
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concerning the place of religious law in the constitution and the general attitude 
that the government should take in regards to custom and religious practice and its 
role in legislation. The tension climaxed with the political assassination of Chokri 
Belaid, a leading liberal politician, in February 2013 and then the assassination of 
Mohamed Brahmi, a less influential liberal, in July 2013 (Al-Jazeera, 2013). An 
extremist conservative group, Ansar al-Sharia was blamed for both deaths. The 
second assassination led 60 NCA members to resign, which caused a stalemate in 
the NCA. Riots and protests erupted after Brahmi’s death, largely by liberal 
groups, though there were many counter-protests from conservative groups. In 
October 2013, two years after the election of the NCA, talks began between the 
groups to bring the stalemate to an end. The goal was to choose a new Prime 
Minister to head the government until elections were held (Slama, 2013). 
However, the talks were delayed after parties could not reach a consensus. 
Nonetheless, on January 3,, 2014, delegates began voting on the final draft of the 
Tunisian constitution. On January 9, 2014, Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh 
announced his resignation after members for a Board of Elections were chosen 
and agreed upon. On January 23, 2014, the NCA completed its task and ratified 
the Constitution, only days after the three year anniversary of Ben Ali’s 
resignation (Jasmine Foundation, 2014).  
Since the first protests in Sidi Bouzid and Tunis, Tunisia has led the way 
for the Arab Spring nations, while democracy in Libya and Egypt has struggled. 
Tunisia was the first Arab Spring nation to hold elections and Ennahda’s win 
predicated the win of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, Tunisia’s 
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military is much weaker and notably absent from politics. Amidst the sharp 
political division, the military never interfered and never intended to. This has 
protected democratic institutions because, ultimately, representatives must govern 
the nation since no other actor is capable of ruling. This important difference 
between Tunisia and other Arab Spring nations, namely Egypt, reflects the fact 
that the Tunisian movement has been citizen led, from the very first protest 
through ongoing demonstrations. Tunisia has remained the most stable Arab 
Spring nation, despite continuing protests and government stalling. Protests have 
grown in influence since the Arab Spring and are now a regular occurrence. As 
protest culture has developed in Tunisia, a deepened respect for opposition and 
for freedom of speech is featured in the Constitution. Furthermore, these protests 
have both harmed and helped the legislation. At face value, they have fueled the 
divide between traditionalists and progressives. However, Tunisians are now free 
to express their criticisms of the government and of society. State run media now 
competes with independent organizations. Protests are common, which may have 
led to political instability. However, these protests also shows that citizens have 
found their voices and have discovered their power in a democracy. Tunisians 
now demand the government protect and assist citizens instead of protecting 
leaders from the public. This element of social justice influenced the constitution 
along with the importance of minority voices and opposition. 
The constitution went through numerous drafts and, ultimately, many 
provisions found in the original draft were removed well before the final draft 
came to a vote. Such provisions, frequently tied to religion, were often removed 
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because conservative parties were unable to force their own values into the 
document. All parties had to make concessions. Ultimately, the constitution was a 
consensus document that represents the wide variety in Tunisian opinion. It takes 
elements of tradition and Islam and blends them with elements of secularism and 
rationalism to represent a new democratic form. The approval debate started on 
January 4, 2014. The draft constitution consisted of 146 articles with 256 
amendments offered by deputies of the NCA. Of the 217 members of the NCA, 
two-thirds were necessary to approve the constitution or it could be put to 
referendum. On January 23, 2014, the final articles and amendments were 
approved and on January 26, the new Tunisian constitution was officially adopted 
(Jasmine Foundation, 2013).  In recognition of the occasion, foreign dignitaries 
attended a ceremony in Tunis where French President Francois Hollande stated, 
“The constitution honors your revolution and is an example for other countries to 
follow… It confirms what I had said [when I visited] in July, that Islam is 
compatible with democracy (Al-Jazeera, 2014).”  
Democratic Elements of the Post-Arab Spring Regime 
In looking at the new Constitution, there are many elements which 
indicate the form that democracy is already beginning to take in Tunisia. Some of 
these elements derive from Islam and others are more heavily borrowed from 
Western institutionalism. Furthermore, the relatively new appreciation for the 
value of protest has also heavily influenced the understanding of Tunisian 
democratic values as popular demonstration directly led to a new form of 
government. There are four core principles revealed in the Constitution which 
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speak most clearly to the development of Tunisia: the importance of opposition, 
the role of media and freedom of speech, social justice and equality, and a greater 
role of religion. Each of these four values appears in the constitution as well as in 
social movements and the basic understanding of current events in Tunisia. The 
importance of opposition and freedom of speech institutionalize ijma and shura. 
Social justice and the role of religion are more influenced by the specific 
combination of national history and theology seen in the Tunisian context. The 
desire for social justice comes from the problems faced by the nation during the 
Arab Spring as well as from a cultural push for equality. As Islam protects the 
collective and enhances these specific democratic values, there is a new role for 
religion in government. Islam is first given an explicit role, but we also see the 
influence of theology in the growth of the republic with these democratic and 
religious principles lending themselves to the formation of Tunisian democracy. 
The Constitution ensures protection for each of these principles, principles which 
also grew out of the demands of the Arab Spring.  
The Constitution is primarily a consensus document born out of the 
struggle for recognition among parties. Channels to express opposition did not 
exist under the post-colonial regime. As previously noted, immediately following 
the departure of the French, power rested in the hands of one party. When 
Tunisians demanded independence, a sense of “us versus them” prevailed; the 
nation was largely united against French imperialism. This sense of unity did not 
lend itself to the creation of a multi-party system. In fact, to oppose the leading 
liberators was to oppose nationalism. At that point, there were other minor parties 
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but the only ones that had a voice in the government worked with Neo-Destour. 
After Ben Ali came to power, he outlawed major opposition parties, namely 
Ennahda, and heavily curtailed rights of opponents. Before the revolution, there 
was not an effective multi-party system. However, post-Arab Spring Tunisia 
differs from post-colonial Tunisia as no party led the revolt against the Ben Ali 
regime. It was largely grassroots and citizen-based and did not come from a 
nationalist or other organized movement. Therefore, when the first elections took 
place in 2011, parties scrambled for attention. Islamists appealed to the masses, 
particularly in rural areas. Secularists were more popular in more urban areas, 
especially where education rates were higher. However, the two opposing forces 
were deeply divided which became apparent during the constitutional debates. 
Nonetheless, the development of a multi-party system was not questioned in 
Tunisia. Tunisia already had a parliamentary system in place, so it stands to 
reason that a multi-party system functions best with a parliament. Yet, this created 
tension in the government which eventually led to the four-month stalemate.  
Any observer of post-Arab Spring politics in Tunisia would note that most 
decisions never met the original deadlines. Everything took longer than 
anticipated. After the resignation of Ben Ali in January 2011, the constitution 
called for elections within a month, but elections did not take place until October. 
The NCA was given a mandate to complete the constitution within a year, but it 
took 3 years. Elections were meant to re-occur two years after the first election 
but are now meant to take place later in 2014, which is a year later than originally 
scheduled.  Such delays generally cause alarm in regards to institutional 
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democracy because, frequently, such delays are ploys to delay democratic 
turnover. While this was a legitimate fear in Tunisia (some analysts feared that 
Ennahda would attempt to hold on to power), it has already proved untrue; 
ultimately, all goals were reached. They were generally reached after 
demonstrations and political arguments.  Since no one party has the majority, 
decisions cannot be enacted immediately because consensus cannot be reached.  
Parties initially refused to cooperate and find middle ground until demonstrations 
occured and the situation necessitated cooperation. No one party is at fault 
because all sides at times refused to concede. Originally these delays slowed 
down democratization when consensus between parties could not be reached. 
However, after months of gridlock, the need for consensus that forced politicians 
to work together effectively ensured a respect for opposition, grown out of the 
repression seen under Ben Ali. Because consensus with the opposition was 
ultimately necessary for the NCA to complete its work, certain rights had to be 
granted towards opposition parties.  
However, before the adoption of the Constitution, the divide between 
secularists and Islamists became most evident after the assassination in February 
2013 of Chokri Belaid and the July 2013 assassination of Mohamed Brahmi. Both 
deaths stunned the nation and were greatly mourned by the Tunisian people. Both 
men were liberal leaders, though Brahmi’s death came as a greater shock since he 
was less influential than Belaid. Ansar al-Sharia, an extremist Islamist group, was 
blamed in both deaths. After Brahmi’s death, protests erupted in Sidi Bouzid, the 
symbolic city where the Arab Spring started.  These protests led to counter-
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protests by Islamists. In the aftermath of the assassination, sixty NCA members 
resigned in protest and did not return to work until November 2013. Despite these 
sharp divisions, calls for rebellion were largely ignored. Amidst the chaos of the 
NCA and the stalemate of the government, no one seriously intended to 
overthrow the government and the military never stepped in as it did in Egypt 
(Sadiki, 2013). Instead, though it took four months of virtually no political 
headway, Tunisian representatives had to fix their own problems since no foreign 
power or military threatened to interfere.  
Because of the struggles of opposition, along with a history of political 
repression and the need to cooperate, Tunisians appreciate the value of multiple 
parties in the formation of a democratic state and enshrined opposition in the 
Constitution. Article 59 guarantees rights to the opposition:  
The opposition is an integral element of the Chamber of Deputies 
and shall have the rights that enable it to undertake its tasks in 
parliamentary work. The opposition is guaranteed an appropriate 
and effective representation in all the Chamber’s structures and 
internal and external activities, and it shall be given the presidency 
of the financial affairs committee or the foreign affairs committee 
and the role of rapporteur within one of the two committees. It 
shall have the right to establish and head an investigation 
committee per year. Its duties include active and constructive 
participation in parliamentary work. (Jasmine Foundation. 2014.)5 
This Article is unique and powerful. It not only recognizes the importance of all 
elected voices in Parliament, but it also incorporates the opposition in a very real 
way by giving it very real power. The opposition has the unusual opportunity to 
                                                          
5
  All quotations from the Constitution are referenced from the Unofficial English 
Translation provided by the Tunisian non-governmental organization and watch-dog 
group, the Jasmine Foundation. 
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impact major policy by leading either the committee on finance or foreign affairs 
for Parliament. By granting such a position for a weaker party, the Constitution 
guarantees that the nation must take consultation in decision-making seriously 
because there will necessarily be differing viewpoints overseeing major 
legislative committees. The statement that allows the opposition to hold the 
presidency for one of these committees was an added amendment to the 
constitution. The amendment was approved by the Consensus Committee before 
it reached the NCA. (Typically, in regards to current Tunisian politics, 
“opposition” refers to more than one party that opposes conservative Islamism 
mainly espoused by Ennahda. If the opposition is a conglomerate of parties, like 
the current troika, the party with the most seats would presumably receive the 
presidential position.) Even without this addition, Article 59 demonstrates the 
commitment to consultation by protecting the voice of the opposition. 
While opposition has frequently slowed down the democratic process of 
Tunisia, it ultimately created a constitution that fits the needs of all Tunisians. 
This embodies the consensus (ijma) and consultation (shura) principles of Islam 
and creates an Islamic democracy. In Article 59, we see an institutionalization of 
shura where leaders must account for the opinions of other parties. Furthermore, 
Tunisians offer shura as seen in the frequent demonstrations. Because citizens 
force leaders to listen to their views, leaders must take consultation in order to 
understand the views of citizens. The strong voice of protestors creates this 
element of Islamic democracy. Tunisia’s history also paved the road for shura 
because there was previously no respect for opposition. Yet, this lack of respect 
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could not possibly continue after the 2011 elections because no party held an 
absolute majority in the NCA; therefore, consensus was necessary for the 
government to function. While parties were not always amicable to one another, 
each party had to accept some unfavorable solutions to certain problems in order 
to achieve collective success. In the end, this need for consensus gave the 
opposition a larger voice than would have occurred if a single party held a 
mandate. Therefore, the need for ijma led to the necessity of shura, and we see 
both principles engrained in the Constitution. This Constitutional integration 
indicates elements of Islamic democracy that are present in Tunisia, but that are 
realized in a uniquely Tunisian manner.  
After the self-immolation of Mohamed Boazizi, protestors demanded a 
participatory democracy, and the voice of the people inspired a new form of 
government for Tunisia. Because protests catalyzed a change in government, free 
speech is of greater importance than ever before in Tunisia. After the Arab 
Spring, citizens became more aware of their power to affect change, and are more 
willing to take to the streets. While current demonstrations are often led by 
parties, instead of grassroots movements, they still give Tunisians an opportunity 
to express their opinions. These demonstrations have affected government, though 
they have at times added to the constant delays. Furthermore, after the fall of the 
regime, the media was no longer solely controlled by the state, and new media 
channels, as well as NGO’s, offered alternative sources for current events and 
analysis. The greater protection for freedoms of speech and media was a major 
accomplishment of the Tunisian Arab Spring. It forced the government to 
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incorporate the principle of shura into decision-making as the people’s voice had 
a new impact on government policy and thought which was institutionalized in 
constitutional rights.  The principle of ijtihad also works into this freedom as 
people have the opportunity to learn more about current events.  
Before the revolution, citizens could not fully express displeasure with the 
government. Now, demonstrations occur regularly. Citizens take to the streets 
because they do not believe that their lives have improved with the change in 
government, and, according to polls taken in spring 2013, they saw no significant 
change. Instead, they have witnessed a failing economy and high unemployment 
rate as well as a growing security risk. These concerns are serious and should not 
be ignored. However, the fact that people can protest these problems represents a 
growth in liberty that was not present before. People can openly disagree with and 
even mock the NCA and leaders of Tunisia. They have the freedom to riot in the 
streets without major repercussions (Cherif, 2013). Party politics and plenary 
debates have perhaps had the greatest influence in shaping government attitudes 
and constitutional changes, but mass demonstrations have also proved effective in 
reversing policies, such as the former “complementary clause” that referred to 
women as complementary to men (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This clause was 
present in early drafts of the Constitution but was removed from the final 
revisions. The Pew Research Group polled Tunisians about the state of the 
republic in spring 2013. At this time, the Constitution had not been approved and 
over all, things in 2013 were perceived as getting worse.  According to Pew’s poll 
in 2013, most Tunisians were very dissatisfied with the government and the lack 
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of progress seen two years after the regime change. Only 54 percent of those 
interviewed believed that democracy was preferable to other forms of 
government, and 56 percent preferred stability to democracy while in another 
question, 65% of those surveyed preferred a strong economy to a strong 
democracy6. However, both questions indicate that, in a developing country, 
stability and democracy may be mutually exclusive and that young democracies 
are generally unstable, This assumption slightly manipulates the phrasing of the 
question which could affect the understanding of the word “democracy” by 
respondents. In fact, despite this seeming lack of support for democracy, in spring 
2013, a majority of Tunisians (54%) believed that democracy was preferable to 
any other form of government while 53% felt that it was better to rely on 
democracy to fix the nation’s problems rather than a strong leader. Furthermore, 
most Tunisians supported what PEW terms “democratic principles7,” including 62 
percent of those interviewed who agreed that freedom of speech is very important 
for the country’s future and that anyone should be able to criticize the 
government. Another 71% agreed that it is very important to hold regular, honest 
elections (Pew Research Center, 2013). The desire for freedom of speech is an 
element of the democratization of Tunisia as it plays the role of shura, which is 
necessary for the development of the ummah because it encourages civic 
participation with collective will directing action.  Consultation is institutionalized 
                                                          
6
 This was a dramatic change from 2012 when 55% of those interviewed preferred 
democracy  even if there was some political stability while 38% of those interviewed 
stability even if it was not fully democratic.  
7
 For the purposes of this paper, I do not refer to these ideas as democratic principles, 
since I argue that democratic principles in Tunisia may not necessarily reflect what 
Western nations view as democratic, though in this particular case freedom of speech 
plays a role in democratization.  
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in elections, but protests serve as a non-institutional form of shura. Both forms 
promote participation in democracy by encouraging citizens to voice their 
opinions to leaders and compelling leaders to take citizens thoughts into account.  
While freedom of speech was liberalized, so were media rights. Before the 
revolution, the government only permitted the existence of state-run media. Now, 
numerous NGO’s and media sources are developing. For example, Tunisia Live is 
a youth-led, online news source that reports in English. Its small team reported for 
and contributed to international news sources during the Arab Spring (Tunisia 
Live, 2014). Al-Bawsala is also youth-led and is an independent, non-profit, non-
governmental organization. It focuses primarily on democratic participation and 
protecting “the concepts of social progress and citizen empowerment (Al-
Bawsala, 2013)” by building relationships with representatives and offering 
citizens the tools to educate themselves on ongoing political processes and 
debates. Al-Bawsala embodies the principle of shura by offering citizens and 
elected officials a platform to consult one another.  It monitored the work of the 
NCA and the final constitutional debates and facilitates discussions between MP’s 
and citizens.  These alternative sources make it possible for Tunisians and non-
Tunisians alike to gain information and insight into ongoing events and the 
political processes of the country. The newly won right of the media is important 
to citizens. In Pew polling of spring 2013, 69% of those surveyed believed that 
free media without danger of censorship was important, reflecting another 
example of a principle of democracy that influences Tunisian leaders (Pew 
Research Center, 2013). The development of new media sources allows citizens 
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to gain informed, independent judgment, ijtihad, in order to engage in civic duties 
and practice their rights to express their opinions.  
Freedom of speech and media contributed to the formation of a new 
Tunisian form of government; therefore, it comes as no surprise that these rights 
are protected in the constitution. It is seen subtly in the Preamble and also 
explicitly in the Constitution itself. The first substantive statement of the 
Preamble recalls pride for and loyalty to those who struggled for independence 
and to bring down the autocratic regime and establishes the Constitution, “in 
response to the objectives of the revolution of freedom and dignity.” The 
Republic is built on the work of protestors. Chapter Two of the approved 
Constitution establishes rights and liberties. Under this chapter, Article 30 
guarantees, “freedom of opinion, thought, expression, media, and publication 
(Jasmine Foundation, 2014)” and states that these rights may not be censored. 
Article 36 guarantees the right to peaceful assembly and demonstration, and 
Article 31 guarantees the right to information and to access information as well as 
a right to access communication networks. This article means that media should 
not solely be run by the state. Both article 30 and 36 were passed unanimously by 
the NCA. Both articles were amended to remove possible legal limitations. The 
amendments imply that there is a fear that these rights could be derogated, so the 
Assembly removed wording that was unclear in order to further protect these 
freedoms.  These freedoms have now been institutionalized and must be protected 
under the Constitution. 
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Now, censorship cannot legally exist. However, in December 2013, 
Amnesty International reported on the case of Jabeur Mejri, a blogger who was 
jailed after expressing views contrary to Islam.  Amnesty International (2013) 
referred to this as the first “opinion jailing,” but there have been other examples 
of persons who were persecuted for expressing viewpoints contrary to Islam. This 
form of verbal persecution climaxed during the constitutional assembly when a 
member of the opposition received death threats after an Ennahda deputy called 
the opponent “an enemy to Islam (Jasmine Foundation, 2013).” In response to the 
potential violence, the opposition proposed an amendment to Article 6 of the 
Constitution in order to outlaw accusations of apostasy, or takfir. The amendment 
was accepted and also outlawed incitement to violence. This amendment should 
provide needed protection for more liberal or secular politicians whose lives have 
been endangered for voicing their beliefs, which are not in accord with Islam. 
However, the president of Al-Bawsala referred to the amendment as “draconian” 
because she believes that such wording goes against freedom of expression. 
Article 6 now provides protection for some who have exercised this freedom 
while simultaneously limiting freedom of speech. This is a common theme in the 
adopted Constitution. In order to equalize rights for all, certain freedoms are 
limited. This seems contrary to the modern notion of democracy because modern 
democrats believe that a nation must be free to be democratic. Yet, in reality, 
most democratic governments still employ some limitations on complete freedom 
of speech to prevent violence. For example, in the United States, one may not yell 
“Fire!” in a crowded, public space unless there is an actual fire. Tunisian 
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representatives understand different forms of speech to evoke violence. Since, in 
this context, delegates see a direct correlation between accusations of apostasy 
and violence, it seems a natural progression to limit freedom in order to prevent 
future violence. Tunisian democracy gives greater importance to equality and 
stability than to full liberties. The goal of the government is not the actual 
protection of liberties, but a just and equal society with balanced opportunities for 
all people and regions. Freedom is still an important principle of the formation of 
the government, but social justice plays a more active role in the Tunisian 
Constitution.  
Social justice was a primary goal of the revolution and inequalities led to 
protestors’ anger. In Tunisia, this can be seen in Constitutional principles. 
Furthermore, regional disparities are a major problem in Tunisia; the Arab Spring 
called for more opportunities and fiscal aid for poorer and rural areas. Regardless 
of where the disparities exist, the call for social justice reflects a broader, religious 
influence. It also demonstrates an understanding of democracy in terms of 
equality rather than a protection of rights. While, in reality, Western democracies, 
particularly American democracy, focus on liberty and broad personal freedoms 
originating in a protection of natural rights, non-Western nations often prefer 
egalitarian governments and believe that democracy is equipped to bring equality 
to all. In Tunisia, this idea is codified in the Constitution.  
One of the more controversial sections of the Constitution, Article 12, 
institutes positive discrimination in favor of deprived regions. This article was 
initially rejected by the NCA, but after the body was permitted to re-visit a 
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different, protested article, deputies insisted on re-examining Article 12. During 
the re-vote, the article passed with 150 for and 3 against. It now reads, “The state 
shall seek to achieve social justice, sustainable development, and balance between 
regions, and to make good use of national resources based on national indicators 
and the principle of positive discrimination (Jasmine Foundation, 2013).”  In 
many ways, this section seems contradictory of the idea of equality through 
democracy by using a form of discrimination. If the goal of democracy is to 
protect natural equality, and if democracy encourages capitalist development, then 
this article would be problematic. However, since the creation of equality stands 
as a goal of Tunisian democracy, then this Article represents the implementation 
of this goal. This article would benefit less wealthy, generally interior, regions of 
the state by offering them previously unavailable resources. Regional inequality 
was a major problem before the Arab Spring and stimulated civil unrest. 
According to a 2011 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
three deprived cities, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Thala were instrumental in 
leading the uprising. The report also states that, within the 5 years before the Arab 
Spring, the wealth gap between the rich and poor grew for various reasons. 
Meanwhile, wealth gaps between regions also widened. Furthermore, these rural 
areas lacked adequate infrastructure, including health care and education, and 
suffered from higher unemployment rates (Achy, 2011). These problems tell us 
that there was a legitimate need to provide greater help to these regions through 
use of positive discrimination. As a major goal of the Arab Spring, it would go 
against the overall interests of the nation to not include this article. Furthermore, 
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while individualists would suggest that such a policy hurts the self-interests of 
wealthy companies in Tunis, the call of greater social justice and equality prevails 
over individualism in Tunisian democracy.  
The most basic example of the protection of equality is under Article 20, 
“All citizens, male and female alike, have equal rights and duties and are equal 
before the law without any discrimination (Jasmine Foundation, 2013).” This 
article starts Chapter 2, which details rights and liberties. It provides the 
framework for following articles that establish a system to guarantee social rights 
for citizens. Many of these rights are considered protected human rights under 
treaties that Tunisia has signed. Nonetheless, protecting rights in a Constitution 
that seek to equalize a society puts these rights on a higher level than if they were 
protected only in the legal code or in treaties.  Examples include the right to 
health and health care, the right to education, and the right to work.  The right to 
health falls under Article 37 in which the State also provides the right to 
preventive health care and treatment by ensuring free health care for low-income 
citizens. Immediately following that, Article 38 mandates education by providing 
free public education at all stages. Education also serves as a tool to encourage 
Arab-Islamic culture while seeking to give students appreciation for other cultures 
and human rights philosophy. For a constitutional provision to protect education 
on this level reflects its cultural importance. Some Tunisians have pointed to their 
level of education as a cause for the Arab Spring as they take pride in their 
understanding of rights and in their awareness of the larger world. This cultural 
pride is now codified to ensure that future generations will also be able to enjoy 
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this education. It also ensures that future leaders will have a respect for human 
rights as education thereof will be institutionalized. Next, Article 39 codifies the 
right to work as an equal right for men and women and affirms that the State 
should “ensure the availability to work on the basis of competence.” While this 
largely reflects the state of the economy and the current need for job-creation, it 
also represents the desire for the state to improve the lives of citizens in a tangible 
way. Forcing the State to provide health insurance for low-income citizens, 
providing free public education at all stages, and playing a role in providing work 
exemplifies ways that Tunisian government is expected to affect daily life. This 
role seemingly contradicts another article concerning local government under 
Chapter 7 which states that government should be based on the principle of 
decentralization. However, this simply means that the local government should 
play a more energetic role in providing for citizens. If a government is rooted in 
providing equal opportunities for all, then the definition of strong government 
may shift slightly. Citizens would expect government to be visible and energetic 
in providing social services, but it should guard against falling into the pattern of 
history and becoming an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, an emphasis on 
equality and social justice replicates religious ideals as governmental goals. While 
the Constitution is not based on religious laws and these Articles do not stem 
directly from religion, the cultural mindset is such that they are simply an 
ingrained idea that corresponds to Muslim values such as integration of the 
ummah.  The participation of the community is a necessary value both in Islam 
and in democracy, but in Islam, members of the community have the duty to 
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protect and help one another. Therefore, in the formation of democracy, we see a 
government committed to aiding communities by helping citizens. The 
government does not focus on the individual or protecting private rights but on 
the collective good.  
This cultural mindset, heavily influenced by Islam, strengthens the need 
for greater equality and social justice which is then codified in the Constitution. 
Interpretations of Quranic meanings and Islamic principles have changed over the 
years, just as with any religion. However, the basic standards have remained 
constant, even if they are understood differently in everyday lives and in the 
formation of a Muslim society today. In fact, they are expected to change; this is 
why there is the principle of ijtihad. Muslims are expected to exert their own 
judgment in applying the tenets of Islam in daily life. Ijtihad, shura, and ijma 
were practiced in forming the Constitution as seen in articles of the document 
itself and also in the debates of the Constitution. All parties had to make sacrifices 
in order to reach a consensus. In part this is due to the lack of one majority party 
which meant that no party could vote an article through without the support of 
other parties. Yet, the act of ijma reflects the nature of the government as both 
democratic and Muslim. While ijma is necessary in Islamic governance, its 
existence in the Constitution does not make the document inherently Islamic. It 
points more to the manifestation of religious institution alongside Western 
institutions. The same may be said for shura. Demonstrations and elections are 
democratic methods for a people to express their voice, and they offer officials an 
opportunity to gain a sense of popular opinion. These approaches may be a 
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modern form of shura. It provides for a participatory democracy in which the 
ummah dictates direction by voicing satisfaction or opposition to leaders.  
In looking at the intended role of religion, there is a feeling among the 
general population that religion should have a small role in government. To 
explore this viewpoint, one can refer again to the Pew Research Global Attitudes 
Project of 2013 for Tunisia. The survey was administered in the spring of 2012 
and 2013, so we may compare the changes in attitude. In terms of religion, in 
2013, the majority of Tunisians preferred a small influence of religion in the 
formation of government, though there was not an overwhelming consensus on 
the issue, reflecting the division in political bodies. In looking at the role that 
religious leaders should play, we refer to two questions. When asked how much 
influence religious leaders should have in political matters, the largest percentage 
(30%) of those interviewed said that they should have some influence. However, 
27% said they should have no influence at all and 14% said they should no 
influence while 24% said they should have a large influence. This also means that 
54% prefer for religious leaders to have at least some influence in politics while 
41% do not want religious leaders to have a role in politics. When asked if it was 
important that religious parties be allowed to participate in government, 53% of 
those interviewed found it very important. This also reflects the previous 
oppression of religious parties as well as an appreciation for the greater freedoms 
of political parties. However, when asked about the role of Islam and the Quran in 
laws, 59% of respondents agreed that, “Laws should follow the values and 
principles of Islam, but not strictly follow the teachings of Islam.” This compares 
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to 11% who do not believe that laws should support the teachings of the Quran, 
and 29% who hold that laws should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran 
(Pew Research Center, 2013). While Tunisians were largely split on most issues, 
a majority agreed that basic Muslim values should be present in the law code. 
This desire was followed in the Constitution as it did not use sharia law and may 
not draw directly on the Quran, but many religious principles are still evident in 
the construction of the law and in some of the articles.  
The first Article of the Constitution following the Preamble in its 
approved form reads, “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its 
religion is Islam, its language is Arabic, and its form of government is a republic. 
This article cannot be amended (Jasmine Foundation, 2013).” This article 
received a number of amendments which were not approved but would have 
explicitly altered the source of legislation for Tunisia. Months before the approval 
of the Constitution, debate raged on the wording of this Article, with Ennahda 
promoting greater protection of Islam and the use of religious law as legislation. 
During the debate on the article, amendments arose which sought to refer to Islam 
or the Quran and Sunnah (Islamic religious law) as sources of legislation for 
Tunisian law. These amendments were not approved. The opposition prevented 
such changes by agreeing to the added phrase, “This article cannot be amended.” 
The article as approved blends both sides of Tunisian politics by demonstrating 
the deep-rooted dedication to Islam that is a vital part of the national identity. 
However, the lack of usage of Sharia, the Sunnah, and Quranic law also points to 
a commitment to protect secularist ideals that Habib Bourguiba instilled in the 
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post-colonialism period and that still influence liberal leaders.  Furthermore, Islam 
is not the religion of the state as Article 141, which referred to it as such and 
would have prevented amendments to the Constitution that prejudiced Islam, was 
struck down. In exchange for the removal of Article 141, Article 1 may not be 
amended.  
Freedom of religion is highly protected, though it sometimes comes into 
conflict with freedom of speech8. This freedom is expressed under the previously 
examined Article 6:  
The state shall protect religion, guarantee freedom of belief, and 
conscience and religious practices, and ensure the impartiality of 
Mosques and places of worship away from partisan 
instrumentalization. The state shall commit to spreading the values 
of moderation and tolerance, protecting sanctities and preventing 
attacks on them, just as it shall commit to preventing calls of takfir 
and incitement to hatred and violence and to standing against them 
(Jasmine Foundation, 2013). 
The protecting of religion should be expected; however, the assurance of 
impartiality in mosques implies that politically religious groups should not meet 
in mosques and places of worship, and that mosques should remain neutral in 
politics. While not directly imposing a separation of church and state, it does call 
for a practical partition between these two spheres. Furthermore, this resembles 
laïcité in calling for neutrality on the part of places of worship rather than solely 
neutrality of the State as the arbiter on the place of religion in public life. It differs 
from American secularism because democracy as an institution is seen to function 
on a religious and even social level, not just a state level, which calls for a more 
                                                          
8
 The tension between these two freedoms is often present in democracies. For example, 
in the United States, religious speech is the most highly protected form of speech.  
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institutional separation of the spheres. This mild separation indicates a victory for 
liberal parties as well as a respect for certain forms of secularism while also 
protecting Islam and other religions. One may even argue that it better protects 
religious institutions by keeping politics out of the Mosque. It also promotes a 
specific form of religion, because it promotes moderation, which is to say that it 
seeks to dissuade extremism. Extremism is an increasing worry in Tunisia, chiefly 
in the form of Ansar al Sharia, the group blamed for the assassinations of 2013. 
Tunisia has also had feared the infiltration of extremists from neighboring nations, 
namely revolutionaries of Libya with the fall of former dictator Gaddafi. This 
Article protects religion and also those who are not religious while also 
envisioning the ideal Muslim state in the modern world, a moderate state guided 
by tolerance and discouraging of religious violence.  
 Other minor provisions that demonstrate the role of religion in the state 
fall under the purview of the Executive. Article 73 states that the President of the 
Republic must be Muslim. This provision was included in the original 
Constitution of 1959. While the overwhelming majority of Tunisia is Muslim and 
likely not affected by this article, it still has the potential to discriminate. This 
article reminds Western observers of the deeply religious nature of citizens, even 
in this nation that upholds many liberal ideals. The president also has the power to 
appoint and dismiss the General Mufti. The Mufti serves the State as a religious 
advisor. According to the website for the Republic of Tunisia, his functions 
include answering questions about Islam, representing Tunisia at “Islamic 
scientific seminars” and “Islamic international academies,” and offering opinions 
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on schoolbooks, documents, and studies relating to Islam (Republic of Tunisia, 
2014). A mufti generally stands as the head of the ulema, or religious scholars, 
and is an expert on religious law. This Article gives the president an express 
religious power as the Mufti is influential for the practice of Islam in Tunisia. It 
gives the president a chance to influence the way religion is viewed in the nation.  
 Religion plays a role in Tunisian government, though this role is largely 
implicit. Many of the policies surrounding religion seek to divide the two spheres. 
However, elements of the constitution and democratization of Tunisia are 
inherently Islamic. Islam still maintains protection under the new Constitution but 
some of its legal influence has been mitigated. Culturally and socially, Islam 
holds a special importance which is reflected in the new institutions of the 
Republic. It was also reflected in the debates of delegates and in the conversations 
between parties. However, the previous existence of secular practices ensured a 
level of respect for a separation of church and state. While this separation is mild 
compared to Western states, it is dramatic for the area. Now, the form of 
government represents Tunisia’s unique history and culture.  
Conclusion: 
The religious principles of ijma, shura, and ijtihad are present in 
the young Tunisian democracy. They exist on an institutional level in the 
Constitution, primarily in protections for opposition parties and the 
understanding of freedom of media and speech, often seen in the form of 
protests. These freedoms promote independent judgment and the need for 
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government leaders to consult with citizens as well as with minority 
parties. The important role of the opposition reflects Tunisia’s historical 
need to grant wider freedoms to ensure a politically competitive system.  
The need to build consensus and work across party lines ultimately 
necessitated a larger role for opposition groups in framing the 
Constitution, which has ensured future rights for less influential parties. 
This unusual dichotomy between dissent and consensus present in Tunisia 
would be an area for future research, particularly as the role of the 
opposition is manifested in future elections. 
 The desire for social justice and a role of religion in government is 
reflected in the Constitution. However, these values come from a largely societal 
push. Social justice is a uniquely Tunisian democratic principle, especially in 
providing special aid to impoverished districts of Tunisia. Equality is not an 
inherently Western democratic principle; however, in Tunisia, there is a sense that 
the formation of democracy can be used to create equality. This lends a special 
importance to social justice. Protection of rights is an important role of 
government, but the goal is to promote equality on a physical level. Religion 
influences each of these principles along with the incorporation of shura, ijma, 
and ijtihad, though the role Islam plays in government features heavily in the 
adopted Constitution and influenced many of the debates leading up to the 
ratification. Because of this strong position, Tunisia has adopted a form of Islamic 
democracy that does not totally adhere to Western democracy. It has different 
goals, and equality is a primary goal instead of a by-product of institutions. 
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Furthermore, while Tunisia’s institutions are necessary in the development of 
government, they are not the primary source of democracy. Democracy stems 
from societal values, largely influenced by Islam, and the people’s desire for a 
new government. We may now expect certain values to shape the future of 
governance in Tunisia, while accepting that the future democracy may not follow 
Western guidelines for the development of democracy.  
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